Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Socially optimal Nash equilibrium locations and privatization in a model of spatial duopoly with price discrimination

Eleftheriou, Konstantinos and Michelacakis, Nickolas (2015): Socially optimal Nash equilibrium locations and privatization in a model of spatial duopoly with price discrimination.

WarningThere is a more recent version of this item available.
[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_63893.pdf

Download (84kB) | Preview

Abstract

We generalize Beladi et al. (2014) for any non-negative, increasing, continuous function of distance as transportation costs function. By doing so, we show that in a duopoly, partial privatization does not change the socially optimal character of the Nash equilibrium location. Our results call for further research on testing their robustness under the existence of more than two competing firms.

Available Versions of this Item

Logo of the University Library LMU Munich
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the University Library LMU Munich in Germany.