Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Bargaining agenda, timing, and entry

Fanti, Luciano and Buccella, Domenico (2015): Bargaining agenda, timing, and entry.

[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_64089.pdf

Download (378kB) | Preview

Abstract

In a unionised Cournot duopoly, the present paper extensively re-examines the subject of the bargaining scope between firms and unions. It investigates the endogenous equilibrium agenda (Right-to-Manage vs Efficient Bargaining) that can arise under three timing specification of the bargaining game both for a given duopoly and monopoly with threat of entry. A novel result is that, in sequential negotiations, Efficient Bargaining emerges in equilibrium for a range of the unions’ power larger than in simultaneous negotiations. Moreover, given the potential market deterrence effect of the Efficient Bargaining, the conventional wisdom that this agenda is socially “efficient” can be reversed.

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.