On analysis and characterization of the mean-median compromise method

Ngoie, Ruffin-Benoît M. and Ulungu, Berthold E.-L. (2014): On analysis and characterization of the mean-median compromise method. Published in: International Journal of Scientific and Innovative Mathematical Research (IJSIMR) , Vol. 3, No. 3 (March 2015): pp. 56-64.

Abstract

Most important results in Social Choice Theory concern impossibility theorems. They claim that no function, as complex as it might be, can satisfy simultaneously a restricted number of fair properties describing a democratic system. However, adopting new voting ideas can push back those limits. Some years ago, such a work was boosted by Balinski and Laraki on the basis of evaluations cast by voters to competitors; this is an alternative to arrovian framework which is based on ranking candidates by voters. Recently, Ngoie and Ulungu have proposed a new voting function – defined in both Balinski and Laraki’s spirit – which hybridizes Majority Judgment (MJ) and Borda Majority Count (BMC): the so-called Mean-Median Compromise Method (MMCM). The method puts at its credit the desired properties of MJ and BMC as well; indeed, it reduces their insufficiencies. The purpose of this paper is double: analyse and characterize MMCM features in comparison to other valuable voting functions.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Borda Majority Count, Majority Judgment, Mean-Median Compromise Method, Paradoxes
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General > C14 - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory; D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D60 - General; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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