Quantifying the Impact of Political Frictions on Public Policy

Grechyna, Daryna (2015): Quantifying the Impact of Political Frictions on Public Policy.

Abstract

This paper evaluates the impact of political frictions on fiscal policy in a sample of developed countries. We use a model of fiscal policy that features a lack of commitment by the government, political turnover, and another political friction which can be interpreted either as political polarization or as public rent-seeking. Political turnover increases public debt levels, while political polarization or public rent-seeking lead to higher public spending. We find that political frictions account for 67% of variation in government debt, 36% of variation in government spending, and 24% of variation in taxes in twenty two developed countries.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: fiscal policy; political turnover; political polarization; public rent-seeking.
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E61 - Policy Objectives ; Policy Designs and Consistency ; Policy Coordination; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E62 - Fiscal Policy; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H21 - Efficiency ; Optimal Taxation; H - Public Economics > H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt > H63 - Debt ; Debt Management ; Sovereign Debt

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