Rawlsian allocation in queueing and sequencing problem.

De, Parikshit (2014): Rawlsian allocation in queueing and sequencing problem.

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the implication of a particular kind of allocation rule called Rawlsian allocation rule on queueing and sequencing problems. We find that in case of queueing problems, Efficient allocation rules are Rawlsian but the converse is not true. For a particular class of Rawlsian allocation rule we characterize the unique class of transfer rule that ensures non-manipulability. Also in case of a situation where there is private information in multiple dimension, we find that a the particular kind of Rawlsian allocation rule equipped with a suitable transfer rule works as a panacea.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Queueing problems, Sequencing problems, Strategyproofness, Rawlsian allocation.
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design

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