Los incentivos extrínsecos y el cumplimiento fiscal

Sour, Laura and Gutiérrez Andrade, Miguel Ángel (2011): Los incentivos extrínsecos y el cumplimiento fiscal. Published in: El trimestre económico , Vol. 78(4), (October 2011): pp. 841-868.

Abstract

This paper models the impact of extrinsic incentives in a tax compliance model. It also provides experimental evidence that confirms the existence of a positive relationship between rewards and tax compliance. If individuals are audited, rewards for honest taxpayers are effective in increasing the level of tax compliance. These results are particularly relevant in countries where there is little respect for tax law since rewards can contribute to crowding in the intrinsic motivation to comply.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Extrinsic incentives and tax compliance
• Language: Spanish
• Keywords: compliance with tax obligations, intrinsic motivation, experiments, rewards.
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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