Tax evasion as a determinant of corruption: a game-theoretical analysis

Sokolovska, Olena and Sokolovskyi, Dmytro (2015): Tax evasion as a determinant of corruption: a game-theoretical analysis.

Abstract

We consider a static non-cooperative game theoretic model of tax evasion. Some concepts concerned with strategies of interaction between economic agents are formalized in order to determine further possible presence of corrupt practices.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: tax evasion, game theory, corruption, behavior
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D73 - Bureaucracy ; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations ; Corruption; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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