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Tax evasion as a determinant of corruption: a game-theoretical analysis

Sokolovska, Olena and Sokolovskyi, Dmytro (2015): Tax evasion as a determinant of corruption: a game-theoretical analysis.

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Abstract

We consider a static non-cooperative game theoretic model of tax evasion. Some concepts concerned with strategies of interaction between economic agents are formalized in order to determine further possible presence of corrupt practices.

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