Munich Personal RePEc Archive

A Unified Model of Spatial Price Discrimination

Eleftheriou, Konstantinos and Michelacakis, Nickolas (2015): A Unified Model of Spatial Price Discrimination.

There is a more recent version of this item available.
[thumbnail of MPRA_paper_66557.pdf]

Download (124kB) | Preview


We present a general model of mixed oligopoly, where competing firms exercise spatial price discrimination. Our findings indicate that the Nash equilibrium locations of firms are always socially optimal irrespective of the number of competitors, the level of privatization, the form of the transportation costs and the number and/or the varieties of the produced goods. An immediate implication of this result is that this form of competition is preferable from a welfare point of view.

Available Versions of this Item

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact us: mpra@ub.uni-muenchen.de

This repository has been built using EPrints software.

MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by Logo of the University Library LMU Munich.