Kamal, Mona (2015): Egypt Relative to the COMESA’s Member States: Do Fiscal Policy Rules Matter?
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Abstract
This paper compares Egypt’s most essential macroeconomic indicators with respect to its sisters in the COMESA region. Based on this descriptive analysis, the paper supports mutual coordination between fiscal and monetary policies as a way to enhance the effectiveness of both policies. It suggests the utilization of rule-based fiscal policies rather than discretionary ones to attain social welfare for the whole region. Finally, it recommends the establishment of a supranational coordinating body for fiscal policies within a time frame of 3 to 5 years.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Egypt Relative to the COMESA’s Member States: Do Fiscal Policy Rules Matter? |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination, Fiscal Policy, Comparative Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy |
Subjects: | E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E61 - Policy Objectives ; Policy Designs and Consistency ; Policy Coordination E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E62 - Fiscal Policy E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy ; Stabilization ; Treasury Policy |
Item ID: | 67101 |
Depositing User: | Mona Kamal |
Date Deposited: | 07 Oct 2015 06:13 |
Last Modified: | 29 Sep 2019 12:46 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/67101 |