A Comment on "Multilateral Bargaining"

Maurya, Amit Kumar (2015): A Comment on "Multilateral Bargaining".

Abstract

Krishna and Serrano (1996) study a model of multilateral bargaining, and claim that their analysis is applicable irrespective of whether the surplus exists at the start of the game or it is created after all players agree. We show that their claim is wrong. Their analysis is not applicable when the surplus is created after all players agree. Hence, some of the important real life bargaining situations, like management-multiple unions bargaining and land assembly are not in the scope of Krishna and Serrano (1996).

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Multilateral bargaining, Efficiency
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory

References

[1] Krishna, V. and Serrano, R. (1996), "Multilateral Bargaining", The Review of Economic Studies, 63, 61-80.

[2] Roy Chowdhury, P. and Sengupta, K. (2012), "Transparency, Complementarity and Holdout", Games and Economic Behavior, 75, 598-612.

[3] Rubinstein, A. (1982), "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model", Econometrica, 50, 97-109.

[4] Sutton, J. (1986), "Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction", The Review of Economic Studies, 53, 709-724.