Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Peacemaking and Peacebuilding through Opponent Non-Economic and Economic Homogenization

Soldatos, Gerasimos T. (2015): Peacemaking and Peacebuilding through Opponent Non-Economic and Economic Homogenization. Published in: Economic Research Guardian , Vol. 5, No. 2 (2015): pp. 133-142.

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Abstract

This paper presents a two-agent butter-and-gun neoclassical model of conflict with game-theoretic flavor. When each agent-opponent contemplates individual welfare independently and as if the conflict has been decided in its favor, the optimum outcome is attained when they become alike in tastes over peace and war regardless income distribution. The algebra suggests that this is a matter of putting oneself in the rival’s shoes, of sufficing each with half the butter and presumably leave the richer agent its gun superiority unexploited. This is what both agents realize that has to be done if they act in a decentralized fashion. But, why should the richer opponent dismiss voluntarily its comparative advantage in guns? Therefore, beyond the matter of homogeneity in preferences (non-economic homogenization), the conflict cannot be resolved unless cooperation towards income-equality (economic-homogenization) induced military equilibrium takes place under the auspices of a peace promoting entity. Peacemaking involves the non-economic homogenization referring to a culture of peace, and peacebuilding alludes to the economic homogenization towards inter-agent social-justice.

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