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Vertical Mergers and Downstream Spatial Competition with Different Product Varieties, Revised and Corrected

Eleftheriou, Konstantinos and Michelacakis, Nickolas (2015): Vertical Mergers and Downstream Spatial Competition with Different Product Varieties, Revised and Corrected.

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to revise and correct the results obtained in Beladi et al. [Beladi, H., Chakrabarti, A., Marjit, S., 2008. Vertical mergers and downstream spatial competition with different product varieties. Economics Letters 101, 262-264]. Specifically, we prove that in the pre-merger case, Nash equilibrium locations are socially optimal, whereas a vertical merger will relocate downstream firms by making them move to the right of their socially optimal positions while keeping their in-between distance intact.

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