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Power of Joint Decision-Making in a Finitely-Repeated Dilemma

Kamei, Kenju (2015): Power of Joint Decision-Making in a Finitely-Repeated Dilemma.

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Teams are known to behave differently from individuals, but whether they behave more cooperatively or selfishly is still unsettled in the literature. We let subjects form two-person pairs and play a finitely-repeated two-player public goods game with other pairs, where each person knows the identity of the partner in their pair, and then compare the pairs’ behavior with the behavior of individuals in the same game played against individuals. Pairs contribute significantly more than individuals, especially when they are matched with other pairs for the entire periods. Possible factors that drove this result are discussed in the paper.

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