Schmitz, Patrick W. (2001): The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights. Published in: European Journal of Law and Economics , Vol. 11, No. 1 (2001): pp. 23-28.
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Abstract
Using a simple bilateral trading example with discrete valuations and costs it is demonstrated that in the presence of private information the efficiency of Coasean bargaining may be strictly enhanced if initially no property rights are assigned.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design K - Law and Economics > K1 - Basic Areas of Law |
Item ID: | 6929 |
Depositing User: | Patrick W. Schmitz |
Date Deposited: | 01 Feb 2008 07:30 |
Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2019 23:27 |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/6929 |