Centralized vs. Decentralized Institutions for Expert Testimony

Kim, Chulyoung (2015): Centralized vs. Decentralized Institutions for Expert Testimony.

Abstract

The legal community has been debating the question of who should select and provide expert witnesses at trial: the litigant or the judge? Using a persuasion-game framework, I show that there is a trade-off. On the one hand, the litigant is willing to consult an expert even when the judge is reluctant to appoint her own experts due to high costs. On the other hand, given the same amount of expert advice, the judge can make a more accurate decision when using a court-appointed expert's advice at trial. I show that the cost of expert advice is an important factor in this trade-off and, therefore, in the argument for the reform toward a centralized system for expert witnesses.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: expert witnesses, decentralized institution, centralized institution, persuasion game, evidence distortion
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K41 - Litigation Process

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