Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Transboundary Renewable Resource Management: A Dynamic Game with Differing Non-Cooperative Payoffs

Ida, Ferrara and Paul, Missios (1996): Transboundary Renewable Resource Management: A Dynamic Game with Differing Non-Cooperative Payoffs. Published in: Marine Resource Economics , Vol. 11, No. 4 (1996): pp. 239-245.

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Abstract

Recent conflicts over fish stocks, such as salmon and turbot, have revived public interest in the optimal management of transboundary renewable natural resources. Given that enforcement of binding contracts is often a major obstacle, dynamically consistent or self-enforcing contracting, as proposed by Vislie (1987), must be relied upon. A more general model is developed which recognizes that, in the absence of a cooperative agreement, two countries may enjoy differing economic payoffs. The predictions of the model are consistent with and provide insights into the particulars of the recent disputes.

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