Transboundary Renewable Resource Management: A Dynamic Game with Differing Non-Cooperative Payoffs

Ida, Ferrara and Paul, Missios (1996): Transboundary Renewable Resource Management: A Dynamic Game with Differing Non-Cooperative Payoffs. Published in: Marine Resource Economics , Vol. 11, No. 4 (1996): pp. 239-245.

Abstract

Recent conflicts over fish stocks, such as salmon and turbot, have revived public interest in the optimal management of transboundary renewable natural resources. Given that enforcement of binding contracts is often a major obstacle, dynamically consistent or self-enforcing contracting, as proposed by Vislie (1987), must be relied upon. A more general model is developed which recognizes that, in the absence of a cooperative agreement, two countries may enjoy differing economic payoffs. The predictions of the model are consistent with and provide insights into the particulars of the recent disputes.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Conservation, economic theory, natural resource management, game theory, optimal control theory, fisheries management, renewable.
• Subjects: Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation > Q22 - Fishery ; Aquaculture; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation > Q28 - Government Policy

References

Armstrong, C. W. (1994), "Cooperative Solutions in a Transboundary Fishery: The Russian-Norwegian Co-Management of the Arcto-Norwegian Cod Stock," Marine Resource Economics 9: 329-51.

Clark, Colin W. (1976), Mathematical Bioeconomics: The Optimal Management of Renewable Resources, (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.), New York.

Kaitala, Veijo, and Matti Pohjola (1988), "Optimal Recovery of a Shared Resource Stock: A Differential Game Model with Efficient Memory Equilibria," Natural Resource Modeling 3: 91-119.

Munro, Gordon R. (1979), "The Optimal Management of Transboundary Renewable Resources," Canadian Journal of Economics 12: 355-376.

Munro, Gordon R. and Robert L. Stokes (1989), "The Canada-United States Pacific Salmon Treaty," Canadian Oceans Policy: National Strategies and the New Law of the Sea, D. McRae and G. R. Munro, eds, (U.B.C. Press), 17-35.

Nash, John F. (1953), "Two-person Cooperative Games," Econometrica 21: 128-140.

Plourde, Charles and David Yeung (1989), "Harvesting of a Transboundary Replenishable Fish Stock: A Non-cooperative Game Solution," Marine Resource Economics 6: 57-70.

Vislie, Jon (1987), "On the Optimal Management of Transboundary Renewable Resources: a Comment on Munro's Paper," Canadian Journal of Economics 20: 870-875.