Strategic Voting with Almost Perfect Signals

Venturini, Andrea (2015): Strategic Voting with Almost Perfect Signals.

Abstract

A standard assumption in the literature of strategic voting is the independence of signals. Each juror observes a signal at the interim stage of the game. Then she votes according to her private information in order to maximize her expected utility. This work introduces a dependency between signals, reflecting a more realistic situation, in which evidences can be incontrovertible. We give a full characterization of the symmetric equilibria in non-weakly dominated strategies and we provide a benchmark between the classical approach and this new one.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Voting, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, Condorcet Theorem
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

References

AUSTEN-SMITH, David and BANKS, Jeffrey S. (1996), "Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem", American Political Science Review, 90, 34-45.

BEREND Daniel, SAPIR Luba (2007), "Monotonicity in Condorcet's Jury Theorem with Dependent Voters", Social Choice and Welfare, 28, 507-528.

BERG, Sven (1993), "Condorcet's Jury Theorem, dependency among jurors", Social Choice and Welfare, 10, 87-95.

BOLAND Philip J. (1989), "Majority Systems and the Condorcet Jury Theorem", The Statistician, 39, 181-189.

FEDDERSEN, Timothy and PESENDORFER, Wolfgang (1996), "The Swing Voter's Curse", The American Economic Review, 86, 408-424.

FEDDERSEN, Timothy and PESENDORFER, Wolfgang (1997), "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information", Econometrica, 65, 1029-1058.

FEDDERSEN, Timothy and PESENDORFER, Wolfgang (1998), "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting", American Political Science Review, 92, 23-35.

GERARDI, Dino (2000), "Jury Verdicts and Preference Diversity", American Political Science Review, 94, 395-406.

LADHA, Krishna K. (1995), "Information Pooling Through Majority-Rule Voting: Condorcet's Jury Theorem with Correlated Votes", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 26, 353-372.

LADHA, Krishna K. (1997), "Condorcet's Jury Theorem in Light of de Finetti's Theorem", Social Choice and Welfare, 10, 69-85.

MYERSON Roger B. (1998), "Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem", Games and Economic Behavior, 25, 111-131.