Civic capital and support for the welfare state

Cerqueti, Roy and Sabatini, Fabio and Ventura, Marco (2016): Civic capital and support for the welfare state.

Abstract

We model the way the interplay between tax surveillance institutions and civic capital shapes taxpayers' support for welfare state. We show that, when tax surveillance is tight, rational civic-minded individuals express greater support for welfare spending than uncivic ones. We provide empirical evidence of these preferences using data from Italy, a country that has long posed a puzzle for public economists for its limited civic capital and large welfare state.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: welfare state, redistribution, tax surveillance, social trust, civic capital, social capital
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement; H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government > H10 - General; H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government > H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government; H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies; H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies > H53 - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs; Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics ; Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology; Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics ; Economic Sociology ; Economic Anthropology > Z18 - Public Policy

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