Munich Personal RePEc Archive

A universal construction generating potential games

Kukushkin, Nikolai S. (2016): A universal construction generating potential games.

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Abstract

Strategic games are considered where each player's total utility is the sum of local utilities obtained from the use of certain "facilities." All players using a facility obtain the same utility therefrom, which may depend on the identities of users and on their behavior. If a regularity condition is satisfied by every facility, then the game admits an exact potential; both congestion games and games with structured utilities are included in the class and satisfy that condition. Under additional assumptions the potential attains its maximum, which is a Nash equilibrium of the game.

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