Saglam, Ismail (2016): Regulation versus Regulated Monopolization of a Cournot Oligopoly with Unknown Costs.
Preview |
PDF
MPRA_paper_71796.pdf Download (227kB) | Preview |
Abstract
This paper studies whether a Cournot oligopoly with unknown costs should be left unregulated, or regulated according to the optimal mechanism of Gradstein (1995), or first monopolized and then regulated according to the optimal mechanism of Baron and Myerson (1982). We show that the answer to this question depends on the number of the oligopolistic firms and the size of their fixed costs, as well as on the weight of the producer welfare in the social objective function.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
---|---|
Original Title: | Regulation versus Regulated Monopolization of a Cournot Oligopoly with Unknown Costs |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Monopoly; Oligopoly; Cournot Competition; Regulation; Asymmetric Information |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L51 - Economics of Regulation |
Item ID: | 71796 |
Depositing User: | Ismail Saglam |
Date Deposited: | 08 Jun 2016 14:02 |
Last Modified: | 05 Oct 2019 05:00 |
References: | Baron, D. and D. Besanko (1984), "Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing," RAND Journal of Economics, 15, 447-470. Baron, D. and R. B. Myerson (1982), "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Econometrica, 50, 911-930. Dasgupta, P. S., P. J. Hammond, and E. S. Maskin (1979), "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, 46, 185-216. Dupuit, J. (1844), "De la Measure de l'Utilite des Travaux Publics," Annales des Ponts et Chaussees, 2nd Series, 8 (translated by R.H. Barback as "On the Measurement of the Utility of Public Works." International Economics Papers, 2, 83-110, 1952) Gradstein, M. (1995), "Implementation of Social Optimum in Oligopoly," Economic Design, 1, 319-326. Harris, M. and R. M. Townsend (1981), "Resource Allocation under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, 49, 33-64. Laffont, J. J. and J. Tirole (1986), "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, 94, 614-641. Lewis, T. and D. Sappington (1988), "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand," American Economic Review, 78, 986-998. Myerson, R. B. (1979), "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, 47, 61-74. Riordian, M. (1984), "On Delegating Price Authority to a Regulated Firm," RAND Journal of Economics, 15, 108-115. Rochet, J. C. (1984), "Monopoly Regulation with Two-Dimensional Uncertainty," CEREMADE Discussion Paper, August. Sappington, D. (1983), "Optimal Regulation of a Multiproduct Monopolist with Unknown Technological Capabilities," Bell Journal of Economics, 14, 453-463. |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/71796 |