Wasniewski, Krzysztof (2016): Should we cut on the executive in order to save the constitutional state?
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Abstract
Constitutional states, as a separate category of social structures, are progressively losing their economic power, as measured with their capacity to appropriate the available capital stock. Fiscal policies, and the corresponding institutions of public finance, play a significant role in the public appropriation of capital, both through direct redistribution and indirect incentives to private allocation. Policies evolve into institutions after experimentation, yet, as a species, we are not really good at experimenting with our own social structures. The case of New Zealand and their public reforms shows an interesting path, possibly to follow, so as to increase the capacity of experimenting with fiscal policies – and to devise more efficient institutions - through enhanced fiscal prerogatives of the legislative in comparison to the executive.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Should we cut on the executive in order to save the constitutional state? |
English Title: | Should we cut on the executive in order to save the constitutional state? |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | institutional economics; political economy; fiscal policy |
Subjects: | H - Public Economics > H0 - General H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government H - Public Economics > H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents |
Item ID: | 71852 |
Depositing User: | Krzysztof Waśniewski |
Date Deposited: | 09 Jun 2016 20:16 |
Last Modified: | 10 Oct 2019 16:45 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/71852 |