Chu, Yongqiang (2016): Debt renegotiation and debt overhang: Evidence from lender mergers.
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Abstract
This paper studies whether debt renegotiation mitigates debt overhang and improves investment efficiency. Using mergers between lenders participated in the same syndicated loans as natural experiments that exogenously reduce the number of lenders and thus make renegotiation easier, I find that firms affected by the mergers experience more loan renegotiations and increase capital expenditure investment. I also find that the effect is stronger for firms with higher Q, suggesting improved investment efficiency. Further evidence suggests that the effect concentrates on loans without performance pricing provisions and unsecured loans, providing further support that lender mergers improves investment efficiency for firms suffering from debt overhang ex ante.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Debt renegotiation and debt overhang: Evidence from lender mergers |
English Title: | Debt renegotiation and debt overhang: Evidence from lender mergers |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Debt Overhang, Renegotiation, Syndicated Loan, Underinvestment, Investment Efficiency |
Subjects: | G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G31 - Capital Budgeting ; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies ; Capacity G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance |
Item ID: | 72403 |
Depositing User: | Yongqiang Chu |
Date Deposited: | 08 Jul 2016 18:39 |
Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2019 10:36 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/72403 |