“Peer effects” or “quasi-peer effects” in Spanish labour court rulings

Malo, Miguel Ángel and Martín-Román, Ángel L. and Moral, Alfonso (2016): “Peer effects” or “quasi-peer effects” in Spanish labour court rulings.

Abstract

The current work seeks to ascertain whether rulings on dismissal cases issued by labour courts in Spain are influenced by whether incumbent judges are acting alone in their own court or sharing duties with other judges such as replacement judges, support judges or incumbent judges from other courts. In the approach used, more than one judge acting in a court is considered to be a treatment, and an analysis is conducted into the effect said treatment has had on the percentage of cases in which the judge has found in favour of the dismissed worker. The data used in the research are taken from the information recorded at court level provided by the statistics kept by the General Council of the Spanish Judiciary. A total of 2,888 observations were available, corresponding to the period spanning 2004 to 2012, and the information is the result of constructing a data panel from all the labour courts in Spain. As regards the findings, the percentage of cases ruled in favour of workers increases in line with the unemployment rate. More cases are also ruled in favour of workers during the crisis and in areas where the construction and industrial sector play a greater role. With regard to treatment as the central analysis variable, it may be concluded that there is a significant positive impact on the number of dismissal cases ruled in favour of workers when incumbent judges are not acting alone in their court.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Dismissal; Legal ruling; Labour court; Peer effects
• Subjects: J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers > J65 - Unemployment Insurance ; Severance Pay ; Plant Closings; K - Law and Economics > K3 - Other Substantive Areas of Law > K31 - Labor Law; K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K41 - Litigation Process

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