Распределение прав собственности и максимизация коллективного благосостояния

Kolesnik, Georgiy (2011): Распределение прав собственности и максимизация коллективного благосостояния. Published in: Экономика и математические методы , Vol. 48, No. 2 (April 2012): pp. 40-50.

Abstract

The author considers economic systems with the property rights distributed among several agents. It is shown that outside interests of the owners make management strategies dependent on the property rights allocation. Unfavorable initial property rights allocation together with the barriers on their re-allocation leads to the inefficiency of the firms’ management.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: An ownership allocation and collective welfare maximization
• Language: Russian
• Keywords: property rights, conflict of interests, welfare, efficiency, competition, oligopoly
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets; L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L21 - Business Objectives of the Firm

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