Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Two person zero-sum game with two sets of strategic variables

Satoh, Atsuhiro and Tanaka, Yasuhito (2016): Two person zero-sum game with two sets of strategic variables.

This is the latest version of this item.

[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_73704.pdf

Download (57kB) | Preview

Abstract

We consider a two-person zero-sum game with two sets of strategic variables which are related by invertible functions. They are denoted by (sA, sB) and (tA, tB) for players A and B.

We will show that the following four patterns of competition are equivalent, that is, they yield the same outcome.

1. Player A and B choose sA and sB (competition by (sA, sB)).

2. Player A and B choose tA and tB (competition by (tA, tB)).

3. Player A and B choose tA and sB (competition by (tA, sB)).

4. Player A and B choose sA and tB (competition by (sA, tB)).

Available Versions of this Item

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.