Logo
Munich Personal RePEc Archive

A Bayesian implementable social choice function may not be truthfully implementable

Wu, Haoyang (2016): A Bayesian implementable social choice function may not be truthfully implementable.

Warning
There is a more recent version of this item available.
[thumbnail of MPRA_paper_73747.pdf]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_73747.pdf

Download (70kB) | Preview

Abstract

The revelation principle is a fundamental theorem in many economics fields such as game theory, mechanism design and auction theory etc. In this paper, I construct an example to show that a social choice function which can be implemented in Bayesian Nash equilibrium is not truthfully implementable. The key point is that agents pay cost in the indirect mechanism, but pay nothing in the direct mechanism. As a result, the revelation principle may not hold when agent's cost cannot be neglected in the indirect mechanism.

Available Versions of this Item

Atom RSS 1.0 RSS 2.0

Contact us: mpra@ub.uni-muenchen.de

This repository has been built using EPrints software.

MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by Logo of the University Library LMU Munich.