Are dyads conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment

Morone, Andrea and Temerario, Tiziana (2016): Are dyads conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment.

Abstract

We analysed dyads strategies in one-shot public goods game. By means of a laboratory experiment, using a variant of the strategy-method, we found that more than one third of the dyads are conditional cooperators, whereas 18% can be categorised as free riders.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Voluntary contributions; Conditional cooperation; Free riding; Strategy-method; Experiments
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior; H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods

References

Andreoni, J. (1988), Why free ride?, Journal of Public Economics, 37, 291-304.

Bateman, I., & Munro, A. (2005). An experiment on risky choice amongst households. The Economic Journal, 115(502), C176-C189.

Bornstein, G., & Yaniv, I. (1998). Individual and group behavior in the ultimatum game: Are groups more “rational” players?. Experimental Economics, 1(1), 101-108.

Brandts, J., Saijo, T., & Schram, A. (2004). How universal is behavior? A four country comparison of spite, cooperation and errors in voluntary contribution mechanisms. Public Choice, 119, 381–424.

Chaudhuri, A. (2011). Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature. Experimental Economics, 14(1), 47-83.

Cooper, D. J., & Kagel, J. H. (2005). Are two heads better than one? Team versus individual play in signaling games. The American economic review, 95(3), 477-509. Croson, R. (1996), Partners and strangers revisited, Economics Letters, 53, 25-32.

Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental economics, 10(2), 171-178.

Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., & Fehr, E. (2001). Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Economics letters, 71(3), 397-404.

Hermann, B., Thöni, C., & Gächter, S. (2008). Antisocial punishments across societies. Science, 319, 1362–1367.

Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s consequences, comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Keser, C., & Van Winden, F. (2000). Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 102(1), 23-39.

Kocher, M. G., & Sutter, M. (2005). The decision maker matters: Individual versus group behaviour in experimental beauty‐contest games. The Economic Journal, 115(500), 200-223.

Kocher, M. G., Cherry, T., Kroll, S., Netzer, R. J., & Sutter, M. (2008). Conditional cooperation on three continents. Economics Letters, 101(3), 175-178.

Ledyard, O. (1995). Public goods: some experimental results. In J. Kagel & A. Roth (Eds.), Handbook of experimental economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press (Chap. 2).

Martinsson, P., Pham-Khanh, N., & Villegas-Palacio, C. (2013). Conditional cooperation and disclosure in developing countries. Journal of Economic Psychology, 34, 148-155.

Morone, A., Morone, P., & Germani, A. R. (2014). Individual and group behaviour in the traveler's dilemma: An experimental study. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 49, 1-7.

Morone, A., Nuzzo, S., & Caferra, R. (2016). The Dollar Auction Game: A laboratory comparison between Individuals and Groups. MPRA Paper 72608, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Selten, R., 1967. Die Strategiemethode zur Erforschung des eingeschra¨nkt rationalen Verhaltens im Rahmen eines Oligopolexperimentes. In: Sauermann, H. (Ed.), Beitra¨ge zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung. J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tu¨bingen, pp. 136–168.

Sutter, M. (2005). Are four heads better than two? An experimental beauty-contest game with teams of different size. Economics letters, 88(1), 41-46.