Vertragstheorie: Zum Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström

Müller, Daniel and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2016): Vertragstheorie: Zum Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström.

Abstract

Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström have been awarded the 2016 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for their contributions to contract theory. In this paper, we provide a brief introduction to the field of contract theory and we discuss some of the laureates' central contributions.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Contract Theory: On the Contributions of the 2016 Nobel Laureates Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström
• Language: German
• Keywords: contract theory, moral hazard, hidden actions, incomplete contracts, property rights
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory

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