Ahmed, Rafayal (2018): Dynamic Screening with Differentially Informed Principals.
Albanese, Marina and Navarra, Cecilia and Tortia, Ermanno (2017): Equilibrium unemployment as a worker insurance device. Wage setting in worker owned enterprises.
Alexandrov, Alexei and Pittman, Russell and Ukhaneva, Olga (2018): Pricing of Complements in the U.S. freight railroads: Cournot versus Coase.
Altınok, Ahmet and Sever, Can (2014): Efficient Microlending without Joint Liability.
Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (1998): Incomplete Contracts and Complexity Costs. Published in: Theory and Decision , Vol. 46, (1999): pp. 23-50.
Angyridis, Constantine and Sen, Debapriya (2010): Relative and Absolute Preference for Quality.
Armstrong, Mark (1996): Nonlinear pricing with imperfectly informed consumers.
Armstrong, Mark (2015): Search and ripoff externalities.
Armstrong, Mark and Vickers, John (2009): A model of delegated project choice.
Armstrong, Mark and Zhou, Jidong (2014): Search Deterrence.
Athias, Laure (2007): Political accountability, incentives, and Contractual design of public private partnerships.
Bachev, Hrabrin (2010): Agro-Ecosystem Services – Governance Needs and Efficiency.
Bachev, Hrabrin (2009): Governing of Agro-Ecosystem Services.
Bachev, Hrabrin (2010): Needs, Modes and Efficiency of Economic Organizations and Public Interventions in Agriculture.
Banerjee, Swapnendu and Chakraborty, Somenath (2022): Individual versus Team Production with Social Preferences.
Banerjee, Swapnendu and Saha, Soumyarup (2024): Absolute Power Corrupts Absolutely?: A Political Agency Theoretic Approach.
Barlo, Mehmet and Ozdogan, Ayca (2011): Optimality of linearity with collusion and renegotiation.
Bellemare, Marc F. (2009): The (Im)Possibility of Reverse Share Tenancy.
Bellemare, Marc F. (2010): Insecure Land Rights and Share Tenancy in Madagascar.
Beyhaghi, Mehdi and Mahmoudi, Babak and Mohammadi, Ali (2013): Adverse Selection and Search Frictions in Corporate Loan Contracts.
Bhattacharya, Utpal and Ravikumar, B (1997): From Cronies to Professionals: The Evolution of Family Firms.
Bukvić, Rajko (2022): Пет сила vs Дуги реп. Published in: Нова галаксија No. 3 (2022): pp. 76-89.
Carvalho, João and Cruz, Nuno and Cunha Marques, Rui (2010): Local governments opting for PPPs in the schools sector.
Cato, Susumu and Ebina, Takeshi (2014): Inequality aversion in long-term contracts.
Cave, Jonathan and Marsden, Christopher (2008): Quis custodiet ipsos custodies in the Internet: self-regulation as a threat and a promise.
Ch'ng, Kean Siang and Loke, Yiing Jia (2010): Inconsistency of fairness evaluation in simulated labot market.
Chi, Chang Koo and Choi, Kyoung Jin (2016): The Impact of Firm Size on Dynamic Incentives and Investment. Published in: Rand Journal of Economics , Vol. 48, No. 1 (7 February 2017): pp. 147-177.
D'Agostino, Elena and Lisciandra, Maurizio (2014): Binding and Non-Binding Contracts: A Theoretical Appraisal.
De Chiara, Alessandro (2015): Holding an Auction for the Wrong Project.
Deb, Rahul (2008): Optimal Contracting Of New Experience Goods.
Dey, Oindrila and Banerjee, Swapnendu (2015): Endogenous favouritism with status incentives: A model of optimum inefficiency.
Dey, Oindrila and Banerjee, Swapnendu (2013): Status, incentives and random favouritism.
Di Maggio, Marco (2009): Sweet Talk: A Theory of Persuasion.
Doligalski, Pawel and Ndiaye, Abdoulaye and Werquin, Nicolas (2020): Redistribution with Performance Pay.
Donze, Jocelyn and Gunnes, Trude (2013): Becoming "We" Instead of "I", Identity Management and Incentives in the Workplace.
Driouchi, Ahmed and Mertou, Amat (2012): High Implicit Interest Rates in the Context of Informal Traditional Housing Transactions: Evidence from Morocco.
di Iasio, Giovanni and Quagliariello, Mario (2011): Incentives through the cycle: microfounded macroprudential regulation.
di Iasio, Giovanni and Quagliariello, Mario (2011): Incentives through the cycle: microfounded macroprudential regulation.
Ekmekci, Mehmet and Maestri, Lucas (2019): Reputation and screening in a noisy environment with irreversible actions.
Estrada, Fernando (2014): Diagramas de argumentación y política criminal.
Estrada, Fernando (2012): Herbert Simon: bounded rationality y teoría de las organizaciones.
Ewerhart, Christian and Schmitz, Patrick W. (1996): Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge. Published in: Homo Oeconomicus , Vol. XIII, No. 4 (1996): pp. 501-514.
Fabrizi, Simona and Lippert, Steffen (2011): Due diligence, research joint ventures, and incentives to innovate.
Fuentes Castro, Daniel (2005): Incentivos en selección adversa para el control del acceso a espacios naturales protegidos. Published in: Revista de Economía Aplicada , Vol. XIII, No. 37 (2005): pp. 89-106.
Gete, Pedro and Gomez, Juan Pedro (2017): Dealing with Overleverage: Restricting Leverage vs. Restricting Variable Compensation. Forthcoming in: Quarterly Journal of Finance
Ghossoub, Mario (2010): Belief heterogeneity in the Arrow-Borch-Raviv insurance model.
Ghossoub, Mario (2010): Supplement to "Belief heterogeneity in the Arrow-Borch-Raviv insurance model".
Goldlücke, Susanne and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2018): Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments. Published in: European Economic Review , Vol. 110, (2018): pp. 211-222.
Gordanier, John and Chun-Hui, Miao (2009): On the Duration of Technology Licensing.
Grochulski, Borys and Zhang, Yuzhe (2009): Borrowing Constraint as an Optimal Contract.
Grochulski, Borys and Zhang, Yuzhe (2013): Market-based incentives.
Grochulskiy, Borys and Zhang, Yuzhe (2011): Optimal risk sharing and borrowing constraints in a continuous-time model with limited commitment. Published in: Journal of Economic Theory , Vol. 146, (2011): pp. 2356-2388.
Guerrazzi, Marco and Giribone, Pier Giuseppe (2019): The dynamics of working hours and wages under implicit contracts.
Harashima, Taiji (2020): Economic Inequality Exacerbated by Economic Rents from Exploitative Contracting.
Hegadekatti, Kartik (2016): Analysis of Contracts in Various Formats of Blockchain. Published in: Contracts & Commercial Law eJournal , Vol. 18, No. 12 (1 March 2017)
Hegadekatti, Kartik (2017): Brand Tokenization and Monetization Through Cryptocurrencies. Published in: Capital Markets: Asset Pricing & Valuation eJournal , Vol. 09, No. 194 (27 October 2017)
Hoppe, Eva I. (2013): Observability of information gathering in agency models.
Hoppe, Eva I. and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2013): Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study.
Hoppe, Eva I. and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2018): Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory. Published in: Games and Economic Behavior , Vol. 109, (2018): pp. 544-564.
Hoppe, Eva I. and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2019): How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects.
Hoppe, Eva I. and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2012): Public-private partnerships versus traditional procurement: Innovation incentives and information gathering.
Inderst, Roman (2012): Job Protection vs. Contracts At-Will: Trading-off Entrenchment and Shirking.
Inderst, Roman and Peitz, Martin (2012): Network Investment, Access and Competition. Published in: Telecommunications Policy , Vol. 36, No. 5 (June 2012): pp. 407-418.
Inderst, Roman and Tirosh, Gilad (2011): Refunds as a Metering Device.
Jellal, Mohamed (2014): Diaspora famille transferts et contrat implicite.
Jellal, Mohamed (2009): Family Capitalism Corporate Governance Theory.
Jellal, Mohamed (2014): Gouvernance optimale moderne des universités.
Jellal, Mohamed (2015): Pouvoir syndical et régulation des firmes multinationales.
Jellal, Mohamed (2014): Theory of civil war under asymmetric information.
Jellal, Mohamed (2014): A theory of family education incentives and inequality.
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część I – Propozycje podziału. Published in: Górnictwo i geologia IX (Mining and geology IX) , Vol. Seria:, No. Prace Naukowe Instytutu Górnictwa Politechniki Wrocławskiej Nr 118 (Scientific Papers of the Institute of Mining of the Wroclaw Univ. of Technology No.118) (23 March 2007): pp. 43-57.
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część II – Formuły cen węgla brunatnego. Published in: Górnictwo i geologia IX (Mining and geology IX) , Vol. Seria:, No. Prace Naukowe Instytutu Górnictwa Politechniki Wrocławskiej Nr 118 (Scientific Papers of the Institute of Mining of the Wroclaw Univ. of Technology No.118) (23 March 2007): pp. 59-68.
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Influence of structure and ownership of lignite opencast mine and power plant bilateral monopoly on its operation. Published in: Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Symposium on Mine Planning and Equipment Selection MPES/06 (20 September 2006): pp. 26-31.
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Lignite price and split of profit negotiation in bilateral monopoly of lignite opencast mine and power plant. Published in: Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Symposium on Mine Planning and Equipment Selection MPES’06 (20 September 2006): pp. 32-37.
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Lignite price negotiation between opencast mine and power plant as a two-stage, two-person, cooperative, non-zero sum game. Published in: Proceedings of the 8th International Symposium Continuous Surface Mining , Vol. ISBN 3, No. Department of Mining Engineering III, RWTH Aachen University (24 September 2006): pp. 469-476.
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Negocjacje pomiędzy kopalnią węgla brunatnego a elektrownią jako kooperacyjna, dwuetapowa gra dwuosobowa o sumie niezerowej. Published in: Energetyka , Vol. 59, No. No.2 (620) (February 2006)
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć druga – zastosowania w negocjacjach strategicznych i taktycznych. Published in: Górnictwo Odkrywkowe (Opencast Mining) , Vol. XLIX, No. No.1-2 (January 2007): pp. 81-88.
Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć pierwsza – podstawy teoretyczne. Published in: Górnictwo Odkrywkowe (Opencast Mining) , Vol. Vol. X, No. No.1-2 (January 2007): pp. 73-80.
Kang, Kee-Youn (2019): Cryptocurrency and Double Spending History: Transactions with Zero Confirmation.
Kim, Jaesoo and Sly, Nicholas (2010): Job Mix, Performance Pay, and Matching Outcomes: Contracting with Multiple Heterogeneous Agents.
Kombarov, Sayan (2021): Action in Economics: Mathematical Derivation of Laws of Economics from the Principle of Least Action in Physics. Published in: Proceedings of International Conference of Eurasian Economies (24 August 2021): pp. 123-129.
Kou, Zonglai and Zhou, Min (2009): Multi-Tasking vs. Screening: A Model of Academic Tenure.
Landeo, Claudia M. and Spier, Kathryn E. (2007): Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities.
Ledenyov, Dimitri O. and Ledenyov, Viktor O. (2014): On the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward leveraged buyout transactions implementation during private equity investment in conditions of resonant absorption of discrete information in diffusion - type financial system with induced nonlinearities.
Ledenyov, Dimitri O. and Ledenyov, Viktor O. (2014): On the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward leveraged buyout transactions implementation during private equity investment in conditions of resonant absorption of discrete information in diffusion - type financial system with induced nonlinearities.
Ledenyov, Dimitri O. and Ledenyov, Viktor O. (2014): On the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward leveraged buyout transactions implementation during private equity investment in conditions of resonant absorption of discrete information in diffusion - type financial system with induced nonlinearities.
Li, Jianpei (2009): Partnership Dissolution and Proprietary Information.
Liang, Pinghan (2013): Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary.
Lonsdale, Chris and Sanderson, Joe and Watson, Glyn and Peng, Fei (2016): Beyond intentional trust: supplier opportunism and management control mechanisms in public sector procurement and contracting. Published in: Policy & Politics , Vol. 44, (April 2016)
Lumineau, Fabrice and Frechet, Marc and Puthod, Dominique (2011): An organizational learning perspective on contract design. Published in: Strategic Organization , Vol. 1, No. 9 (2011)
Lumineau, Fabrice and Quelin, Bertrand (2012): An Empirical Investigation of Interorganizational Opportunism and Contracting Mechanisms. Published in: Strategic Organization , Vol. 1, No. 10 (2012)
Madarasz, Kristof (2008): Information projection: model and applications. Forthcoming in: Review of Economic Studies
Martimort, David and Semenov, Aggey and Stole, Lars (2015): A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Two-type Common Agency Screening Games.
Martimort, David and Semenov, Aggey and Stole, Lars (2017): A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in a Common Agency Screening Game.
Martimort, David and Semenov, Aggey and Stole, Lars (2014): A Theory of Contracts With Limited Enforcement.
Mele, Antonio (2010): Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans.
Mele, Antonio (2011): Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans.
Miglo, Anton (2021): A New Capital Structure Theory: The Four-Factor Model.
Miglo, Anton (2004): Pecking order theory for government finance.
Miglo, Anton (2014): Timing of Earnings and Capital Structure.
Mitchell, Matthew and Zhang, Yuzhe (2010): Unemployment Insurance with Hidden Savings. Forthcoming in: Journal of Economic Theory
Müller, Daniel and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2017): Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs. Published in: Economics Letters , Vol. 152, (2017): pp. 88-92.
Müller, Daniel and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2021): The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract. Published in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , Vol. 184, (2021): pp. 653-669.
Müller, Daniel and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2016): Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm. Published in: European Economic Review , Vol. 87, (2016): pp. 92-107.
Müller, Daniel and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2016): Vertragstheorie: Zum Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström.
Nabi, Mahmoud Sami (2013): Contingent Profit and Loss Sharing (C-Pls) Contracts.
Nabi, Mahmoud Sami (2013): Profit Sharing and Debt Contracts in Presence of Moral Hazard.
Nijhof, A. and Graafland, J.J. and Kuijer de, O. (2009): Exploration of an agenda for transparency in the construction industry. Published in: Construction Innovation , Vol. 3, No. 9 (2009): pp. 250-267.
Ohlendorf, Susanne and Schmitz, Patrick W. (2011): Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality.
Ojo, Marianne (2013): Why the traditional principal agent theory may no longer apply to concentrated ownership systems and structures.
Ojo, Marianne (2016): Why the traditional principal agent theory may no longer apply to concentrated ownership systems and structures. Published in: Planetary Scientific Research Centre (PSRC) Conference Proceedings (March 2014)
Ong, David (2008): Fishy Gifts: Bribing with Shame and Guilt.
Orman, Cuneyt (2008): Organization of Innovation and Capital Markets.
Pandey, S.S.D. (1991): Trafficking in drugs and economic theory. Published in: ISBN 81-85694-10-9 (1 May 1994): pp. 74-160.
Papakonstantinou, A. and Bogetoft, P. (2013): Crowd-sourcing with uncertain quality - an auction approach.
Papakonstantinou, A. and Bogetoft, P. (2013): Crowd-sourcing with uncertain quality - an auction approach.
Papakonstantinou, A. and Bogetoft, P. (2012): Multi-dimensional auctions under information asymmetry for costs and qualities.
Papakonstantinou, A. and Bogetoft, P. (2012): Short Communication: DEA based auctions.
Pei, Di (2010): Incomplete Contracts: Foundations and Applications.
Peng, Chao and Zeng, Yinchu and Huang, Bo and Yabe, Mitsuyasu (2010): The contracts between leading agribusiness enterprises and rural households: its effects on firm-level export of agricultural products. Published in: Journal of the Faculty of Agriculture, Kyushu University , Vol. 2, No. 55 (October 2010)
Pham, Hien (2023): How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms.
Pham, Hien (2023): How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms.
Pham, Hien (2023): How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms.
Pham, Hien (2023): How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms.
Pitterle, Claudia (2022): Consumer behavior and decision making from officed- based doctors A systematic literature review. Published in: Journal of Economics and Public Finance , Vol. 8, (2022)
Rahkovsky, Ilya (2010): Exclusive contracts in health insurance.
Ramalingam, Abhijit (2009): "Endogenous" Relative Concerns: The Impact of Workers' Characteristics on Status and Pro ts in the Firm.
Ravikumar, B. and Zhang, Yuzhe (2010): Optimal Auditing in a Dynamic Model of Tax Compliance.
Resende-Filho, Moises and Buhr, Brian (2006): A Principal-Agent Model for Evaluating the Economic Value of a Beef Traceability System: A Case Study with Injection-site Lesions Control in Fed Cattle.
Resende-Filho, Moises and Buhr, Brian (2006): A principal-agent model for evaluating the economic value of a beef traceability system: a case study with injection-site lesions control in fed cattle.
Rodriguez, Fabrizio (2023): On Salesforce Compensation with Inventory Considerations. Forthcoming in: Journal of Management Science
Saccal, Alessandro (2021): Efficiency wage (and slavery) efficiency: in theory and in time.
Sadowski, Philipp (2008): Conditional Preference for Flexibility: Eliciting Beliefs from Behavior.
Schmid, Andreas (2007): Incentive Compatibility and Efficiency in the contractual Insurer-Provider Relationship: Economic Theory and practical Implications: The Case of North Carolina. Published in: OPUS Bayreuth No. 481 (6 November 2008): pp. 1-127.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2023): The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts. Published in: European Economic Review , Vol. 157, No. 104511 (2023)
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2024): When Should the Government Own the Physical Assets Needed to Provide Public Goods?
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2017): Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm. Published in: Economics Letters , Vol. 159, (2017): pp. 96-99.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2013): Bargaining position, bargaining power, and the property rights approach.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2006): Book Review of “Contract Theory” (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005). Published in: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics , Vol. 162, No. 3 (2006): pp. 535-540.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2000): Book Review of “Inflation and the Enforcement of Contracts” (Renner, 1999). Published in: Journal of Economics/Zeitschrift für Nationalökonomie , Vol. 71, No. 3 (2000): pp. 336-338.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2023): Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory. Published in: Economics Letters , Vol. 226, No. 111103 (2023)
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2021): Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information. Published in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , Vol. 182, (2021): pp. 100-112.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2000): Der Effekt von Nachverhandlungen auf Investitionen mit Eigen- und Fremdwirkung. Published in: Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium , Vol. 29, No. 6 (2000): pp. 328-330.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2022): How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts. Published in: Economic Journal , Vol. 132, No. ueac024
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2023): Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction? Published in: Economics Letters , Vol. 224, No. 111012
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2019): Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership. Published in: Economics Letters , Vol. 183, No. Article 108558 (2019)
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2017): Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives. Published in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , Vol. 144, (2017): pp. 153-165.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2012): Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2013): Investments in physical capital, relationship-specificity, and the property rights approach.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2012): Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2020): Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm. Published in: Economics Letters , Vol. 186, No. Article 108514 (2020)
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2016): The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information. Published in: Economics Letters , Vol. 145, (2016): pp. 33-37.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (1998): On Randomization in Coalition Contracts.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2010): On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2021): On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries. Published in: Economics Letters , Vol. 202, No. 109823 (2021)
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2014): Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered. Published in: Economics Letters , Vol. 125, (2014): pp. 21-24.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2021): Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information. Published in: Journal of Public Economics , Vol. 198, No. Article 104424 (2021)
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2013): Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered. Published in: Economics Letters , Vol. 121, No. 3 (2013): pp. 533-536.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2013): Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2003): Unmöglichkeitstheoreme bei asymmetrischer Information. Published in: Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium , Vol. 4, No. 32 (2003): pp. 239-242.
Schmitz, Patrick W. (2012): The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability.
Semenov, Aggey (2012): Delegation to potentially uninformed agent.
Sinha, Bhaskar (2017): Management compensation design for a banking firm.
Smits, Jan (2005): Diversity of Contract Law and the European Internal Market. Published in: The Need for a European Contract Law: Empirical and Legal Perspectives No. Groningen (2005): pp. 153-186.
Sokolovskyi, Dmytro (2017): Gaming modeling of self-enforcing agreements and free-rider problem.
Strauss, Jason David (2008): Uberrimae Fidei and Adverse Selection: the equitable legal judgment of Insurance Contracts.
Sun, Ching-jen (2007): A Note on the Dynamics of Incentive Contracts.
Sun, David and Chow, Da-Ching (2014): Forgive, or Award, Your Debtor? - A Barrier Option Approach.
Takahara, Tsuyoshi and Kanda, Yutaka (2023): Designing the report card content for healthcare payment reduction.
Thiele, Veikko (2007): Subjective Performance Evaluation and Collusion.
Tian, Guoqiang and Zhang, Yuzhe (2013): When can we do better than autarky? Published in: Economics Letters
Tirelli, Mario (2018): Optimal financial contracts with unobservable investments.
Todorova, Tamara (2022): Оливър Уилямсън: новатор на 20 век и основател на новата институционална икономика. Published in: : pp. 1-152.
Todorova, Tamara (2011): The State as an Instrument of Transaction-Cost Economies. Published in: Problems of Economic Transition , Vol. 54, No. 7 (November 2011): pp. 31-48.
Todorova, Tamara (2000): Икономическа същност на транзакционните разходи. Published in: Proceedings of the Young Scholars’ Conference “Science in Support of Business and Society,” Varna, May 12, 2000 (2000): pp. 100-113.
Vahabi, Mehrdad (2008): From Walrasian general equilibrium to incomplete contracts : making sense of institutions. Published in: Economie et Institutions , Vol. Vol 1, No. No. 1 (2002): pp. 99-143.
Wayne, James J. (2014): A Physics Solution to the Hardest Problem in Social Science: Physics Foundation of Permanent World Peace.
Wu, Steven and Roe, Brian and Sporleder, Thomas (2006): Mixed Tournaments, Common Shocks, and Disincentives: An Experimental Study.
Yang, Ruilong and Wang, Yuan and Nie, Huihua (2012): “准官员”的晋升机制：来自中国央企的证据. Published in: Management World (in Chinese) No. 3 (1 March 2013): pp. 23-33.
Yurday, Zeynep (2003): The Effects of Interim Performance Evaluations under Risk Aversion.
Zambrano, Juan Carlos and Astaiza-Gómez, José Gabriel and García, Juan David (2021): Un Modelo Principal-Agente Dinámico de Reducción de Perdidas de Energía Electrica en Tiempo Continuo.
Zeng, Zhixiong (2011): A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization. Forthcoming in: Economic Theory
Zhang, Yuzhe (2012): Characterization of a Risk Sharing Contract with One-Sided Commitment. Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (2013)
Zudenkova, Galina (2011): Cronyism in Business, Public Sector and Politics.
Contact us: mpra@ub.uni-muenchen.de
This repository has been built using EPrints software.
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by 
.
![[up]](/style/images/multi_up.png)
Up a level