Management compensation design for a banking firm

Sinha, Bhaskar (2017): Management compensation design for a banking firm.

Abstract

The extant of indigenous literature on bad loans concentrate to analyze the factors that would increase efficient credit allocation by public sector banks in India.. RBI, the Central Bank in India, has mostly tried to promote priority sector lending through various policy steps. However, the list has only become longer. The paper proposes an incentive contract based on information asymmetry model to approach the problem

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Bank Incentive contract deign, compensation design, priority sector lending , rewarding effort.
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit

References

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