Athias, Laure (2007): Political accountability, incentives, and Contractual design of public private partnerships.
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This paper studies political accountability under various contractual forms of Public Private Partnerships. A critical aspect of any PPP contract is the allocation of demand risk between the public authority and the private provider. We show that contracts in which the private provider bears all demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs, since they empower consumers, which provides the public authority with more credibility in side-trading. The policy implication is that the current greater resort to contracts in which the public authority retains all demand risk may not be optimal in terms of allocative efficiency.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Political accountability, incentives, and Contractual design of public private partnerships|
|Keywords:||Political accountabiliy; Public services provision; Public Private Partnerships; Incomplete contracts; Consumers empowerment.|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights
H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government > H10 - General
L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L51 - Economics of Regulation
O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O1 - Economic Development > O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors ; Shadow Economy ; Institutional Arrangements
|Depositing User:||Laure Athias|
|Date Deposited:||03. Sep 2009 20:28|
|Last Modified:||18. Feb 2013 07:17|
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Political accountability, incentives, and Contractual design of public private partnerships. (deposited 18. Sep 2008 09:31)
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