Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information

Schmitz, Patrick W. (2013): Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information.

Abstract

An agent can make an observable but non-contractible investment. A principal then offers to collaborate with the agent to provide a public good. Private information of the agent about his valuation may either decrease or increase his investment incentives, depending on whether he learns his type before or after the investment stage.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: asymmetric information, incomplete contracts, investment incentives, public goods
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory; H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods

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