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Delegation to potentially uninformed agent

Semenov, Aggey (2012): Delegation to potentially uninformed agent.

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Abstract

We consider a delegation problem with a potentially uninformed agent when the principal cannot use monetary payments. If the bias between the principal and the agent is large, then the optimal delegation set is an interval. When the bias is small or medium however, the optimal delegation set is no longer connected. It can be one of two types: with an interval and low option, the other with two intervals. In all cases the agent has less discretion. However, in the case of medium biases the principal delegates in a wider range than in the case of informed agent. In all cases the agent will be given more freedom if he is more informed.

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