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Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Unmöglichkeitstheoreme bei asymmetrischer Information

Schmitz, Patrick W. (2003): Unmöglichkeitstheoreme bei asymmetrischer Information. Published in: Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium , Vol. 4, No. 32 (2003): pp. 239-242.

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Abstract

This paper illustrates in a simple model how the presence of asymmetric information can make it impossible to achieve ex post efficient trade decisions in negotiations.

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