Schmitz, Patrick W. (2010): On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments.
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A seller and a buyer can write a contract. After that, the seller produces a good. She can influence the expected quality of the good by making unobservable investments. Only the seller learns the realized quality. Finally, trade can occur. It is always ex post efficient to trade. Yet, it may be impossible to achieve the first best, even though the risk-neutral parties are symmetrically informed at the contracting stage and complete contracts can be written. The second best is characterized by distortions that are reminiscent of adverse selection models (i.e., models with precontractual private information but without hidden actions).
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments|
|Keywords:||Hold-up problem; hidden action; hidden information; common values|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
|Depositing User:||Patrick W. Schmitz|
|Date Deposited:||09. Jun 2010 03:12|
|Last Modified:||12. May 2015 14:01|
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