Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm

Schmitz, Patrick W. (2017): Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm. Published in: Economics Letters , Vol. 159, (2017): pp. 96-99.

Abstract

In the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights approach to the theory of the firm, it is usually assumed that information is symmetric. Ownership matters for investment incentives, provided that investments are partly relationship-specific. We study the case of completely relationship-specific investments (i.e., the disagreement payoffs do not depend on the investments). It turns out that if there is asymmetric information, then ownership matters for investment incentives and for the expected total surplus. Specifically, giving ownership to party B can be optimal, even when only party A has to make an investment decision and even when the owner's expected disagreement payoff is larger under A-ownership.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Property rights; relationship specificity; investment incentives; private information; incomplete contracts
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory; L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L23 - Organization of Production; L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L24 - Contracting Out ; Joint Ventures ; Technology Licensing

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