When can we do better than autarky?

Tian, Guoqiang and Zhang, Yuzhe (2013): When can we do better than autarky? Published in: Economics Letters

Abstract

This paper provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of nonautarkic contract in a risk sharing model with two-sided lack of commitment. Verifying the condition takes just one Guassian elimination of a matrix.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Lack of commitment, Risk sharing, Autarky
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design

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