Munich Personal RePEc Archive

“准官员”的晋升机制:来自中国央企的证据

Yang, Ruilong and Wang, Yuan and Nie, Huihua (2012): “准官员”的晋升机制:来自中国央企的证据. Published in: Management World (in Chinese) No. 3 (1 March 2013): pp. 23-33.

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Abstract

Using political mobility data for 189 leaders from China’s central state-owned enterprise (CSOEs) in 2008-2011, for the first time this paper investigates the mechanism of political turnover for leaders as quasi-government officers in CSOEs. We find that: (1) the likelihood of promotion of these leaders increases with their economic performance measured as growth rate of operating revenue, while the likelihood of demotion decreases with their economic performance; (2) these leaders with CCP central committee member have higher probability of promotion than their counterpart; (3) these leaders with Ph.D. degree have higher probability of promotion than their counterpart; (4) compared to growth rate of operating revenue, growth rate of maintaining and increasing the value of state capital has no significant effect on promotion; (5) the compensation linked to position in CSOEs has no impact on leaders’ promotion, which indicates that leaders in CSOEs look more likely government officials rather than professional managers.

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