“准官员”的晋升机制：来自中国央企的证据

Yang, Ruilong and Wang, Yuan and Nie, Huihua (2012): “准官员”的晋升机制：来自中国央企的证据. Published in: Management World (in Chinese) No. 3 (1 March 2013): pp. 23-33.

Abstract

Using political mobility data for 189 leaders from China’s central state-owned enterprise (CSOEs) in 2008-2011, for the first time this paper investigates the mechanism of political turnover for leaders as quasi-government officers in CSOEs. We find that: (1) the likelihood of promotion of these leaders increases with their economic performance measured as growth rate of operating revenue, while the likelihood of demotion decreases with their economic performance; (2) these leaders with CCP central committee member have higher probability of promotion than their counterpart; (3) these leaders with Ph.D. degree have higher probability of promotion than their counterpart; (4) compared to growth rate of operating revenue, growth rate of maintaining and increasing the value of state capital has no significant effect on promotion; (5) the compensation linked to position in CSOEs has no impact on leaders’ promotion, which indicates that leaders in CSOEs look more likely government officials rather than professional managers.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: The Political Promotion for Quasi-Government Officers: Evidence from Central State-owned Enterprises in China
• Language: Chinese
• Keywords: state-owned enterprise, promotion, government officer, economic performance, guangxi
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers > J63 - Turnover ; Vacancies ; Layoffs; M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M5 - Personnel Economics > M51 - Firm Employment Decisions ; Promotions

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