Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Strategy proofness and unanimity in many-to-one matching markets

Diss, Mostapha and Doghmi, Ahmed and Tlidi, Abdelmonaim (2016): Strategy proofness and unanimity in many-to-one matching markets.

This is the latest version of this item.

[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_76231.pdf

Download (309kB) | Preview

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a standard model of many-to-one matching markets. First, we study the relation between strategy-proofness and unanimity under a certain requirement and we prove these two properties become equivalent. Second, we illustrate that this result has an immediate impact on the relation between strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity. Finally, we determine a close connexion between strategy-proofness and implementation literature. We provide under certain minimal requirements the foundation for reasoning the equivalence among dominant strategy implementation, standard Nash implementation, and partially honest Nash implementation.

Available Versions of this Item

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.