Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity.

Moreno-García, Emma and Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo (2017): Information within coalitions: risk and ambiguity.

Abstract

We address economies with asymmetric information where agents are not perfectly aware about the informational structure for coalitions. Thus, we introduce solutions that we refer to as risky core and ambiguous core. We provide existence results and a variety of properties of these cooperative solutions.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Differential Information, risky core, ambiguous core
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium > D51 - Exchange and Production Economies; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design

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