Representation and Social Regret in Risk-Taking

İriş, Doruk (2017): Representation and Social Regret in Risk-Taking.

Abstract

Representing others brings responsibility and fear of letting others down (social regret). We incorporate these phenomena in a theoretical model and provide a psychological perspective to explain the individual-group discontinuity in risk-taking activities. A representative makes a state-wise comparison of the consequences of her decision and an unchosen advice given by a group member. Social regret-aversion renders extreme utility differences salient and allows both risky and cautious shifts.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Social representation; Social regret-aversion; Risk-taking; Individual-group discontinuity; Risky shift; Cautious shift.
• Subjects: A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values; D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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