Les Institutions de Microcrédit et la Lutte Contre la Pauvreté : L’initiative d’Enda Interarabe en Tunisie

Trabelsi, Mohamed Ali and Chichti, Jameleddine (2011): Les Institutions de Microcrédit et la Lutte Contre la Pauvreté : L’initiative d’Enda Interarabe en Tunisie. Published in: La Revue des Sciences de Gestion , Vol. 250, No. 249 (2011): pp. 147-155.

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to show, jointly by means of theoretical and empirical studies and through the pan-arab Enda case installed in Tunisia, that the adoption of a policy of credit rationing makes it possible to cure the problems of information asymmetry and to ensure the performance of refunding. This may, consequently, lead to the exclusion of a part of the microcredit market’s poor borrowers. Against this background, we will develop a suitable econometric model like the credit scoring (Schreiner Mark, 2000) which can predict the behavior of a customer, requiring a microcredit, in order to distinguish between good and bad borrowers.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Microcredit Institutions and the Battle Against Poverty: The Pan-Arab Enda Initiative in Tunisia
• Language: French
• Keywords: microcredit, microfinance, organization, social economy, poverty
• Subjects: A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General > C13 - Estimation: General; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I3 - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty > I32 - Measurement and Analysis of Poverty; L - Industrial Organization > L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise > L31 - Nonprofit Institutions ; NGOs ; Social Entrepreneurship

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