Violations of Uniform Partner Ranking Condition in Two-way Flow Strict Nash Networks

Charoensook, Banchongsan (2017): Violations of Uniform Partner Ranking Condition in Two-way Flow Strict Nash Networks.

Abstract

The paper of Charoensook ((2015), [3]) extends the results of the original model of two-way flow information sharing network of Bala and Goyal ((2000),[1]), given that a condition called Uniform Partner Ranking is satisfied. In this technical note, we study what happen to these results when this condition is violated. By providing some examples, we conclude that a certain degree of agent homogeneity needs to exist in order that the results of [3] remains satisfied.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Network Formation, Strict Nash Network, Two-way Flow Network, Branching Network, Agent Heterogeneity,Information Network
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory

References

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