Carrera, Jorge Eduardo (1995): Efectos precio y comercio en un area monetaria asimetrica. Published in: Económica , Vol. 42, No. 2 : pp. 89-124.
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Abstract
Using a three countries model with flexible exchange rates, this study tries to analyze the situation in an asymmetric monetary area around a big country. The model consider a stochastic framework where the monetary policy is used to stabilize the inflation and the current account. The monetary policy works through the exchange rate and the interdependence is a consequence of the exchange rates spillovers (trade and prices effects). The Nash equilibrium was obtained and based on this result it is showed under wich circumstances cooperation could improve the policymakers situation. The relation between spillovers specifyes the optimal monetary policy choice between coordination or Nash (to fix the exchange rates or not) and the viability of the coordination rule.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Efectos precio y comercio en un area monetaria asimetrica |
English Title: | Price and trade effects in an asymmetric monetary area |
Language: | Spanish |
Keywords: | monetary unions, game theory, asimetry, exchange rates, Nash , policy cooperation,three countries model |
Subjects: | F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance > F32 - Current Account Adjustment ; Short-Term Capital Movements C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance > F33 - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions |
Item ID: | 7844 |
Depositing User: | Jorge Eduardo Carrera |
Date Deposited: | 20 Mar 2008 11:22 |
Last Modified: | 28 Sep 2019 07:14 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/7844 |