Abnormal Retained Earnings Around The World

Alves, Paulo and Silva, Paulo (2017): Abnormal Retained Earnings Around The World.

Abstract

Using a firm-level survey database covering 50 countries we evaluate firms´ abnormal retained earnings. The results of our work indicate that firms located in emerging markets retain more earnings than firms from developed countries. On the other hand, firms located on common law based countries retain earnings above the expected and higher than firms placed on civil law based countries. A possible explanation, according to our results, can be seen in the economic growth that these countries have shown in the past 20 years. The financial crisis of 2008 and its impact in the abnormal retained earnings can help to validate this result. Finally, we would like to draw attention upon the impact of the firms´ size on abnormal retained earnings. According to our results this relationship is positive. This strongly questions the growth of smaller companies.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Abnormal retained earnings; Financing choices; Institutional environment; Small firms.
• Subjects: G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G31 - Capital Budgeting ; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies ; Capacity; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance

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