MABROUKI, Mohamed (2017): Le brevet instrument de politique économique pour promouvoir l’innovation au profit de la croissance : discussion théorique.
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Abstract
At the theoretical level, the establishment of a patent system has two objectives: to encourage firms to produce new knowledge and to disseminate information. However, economic practice has highlighted the dilemma between protection and dissemination. This paper discusses how to determine the optimal level of protection across the three dimensions of the patent. While the representation of patent characteristics by microeconomic models is very rich and detailed, innovation-based growth models that have examined with precision how growth can vary with the system of industrial protection are few. The representation of three dimensions of the patent, by these latter models is rather abstract.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Le brevet instrument de politique économique pour promouvoir l’innovation au profit de la croissance : discussion théorique |
English Title: | The patent economic policy instrument to promote innovation for growth: theoretical discussion |
Language: | French |
Keywords: | Innovation Brevet Croissance |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D0 - General O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O34 - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital |
Item ID: | 80317 |
Depositing User: | Mohamed MABROUKI |
Date Deposited: | 22 Jul 2017 22:33 |
Last Modified: | 30 Sep 2019 15:22 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/80317 |