Duality in land rental problems

Valencia-Toledo, Alfredo and Vidal-Puga, Juan (2017): Duality in land rental problems.

Abstract

A single tenant demands a particular amount of land from several lessors. The way lessors rent their land can be seen as equivalent to a bankruptcy problem. We extend self-duality in bankruptcy problems to these land rental situations. We provide a complete characterization of the family of rules that satisfy self-duality. Moreover, self-duality is enough to assure that the amount of land is proportionally shared among the lessors. Adding other reasonable properties, we pick up a single rule.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Self-duality; land rental problems; bankruptcy problems; proportional rule
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games

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