The efficiency wage hypothesis and the role of corporate governance in firm performance

DiGabriele, Jim and Ojo, Marianne (2017): The efficiency wage hypothesis and the role of corporate governance in firm performance. Forthcoming in: IGI Global

Abstract

As well as a two-fold contribution to the literature as highlighted in their paper“, Financial Disruptions and the Cyclical Upgrading of Labor” (2017:8), and elaborated on by Epstein et al, the reconciliation of two quantitative limitations of current general equilibrium theories constituting part of such contribution, this paper highlights the need to incorporate other theories such as those relating to the economics of the firm – in explaining firm performance – given the previously highlighted limitations of “canonical models”.

The inability to account for variables which are independent of exogenously or endogenously determined factors and which are outside their model, also necessitates the incorporation of other theories and factors to be taken into account in arriving at more accurate conclusions which determine firm performance.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: efficiency wage hypothesis; pro cyclicality; financial cycles; firm performance; corporate governance
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E3 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook; G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance; M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M4 - Accounting and Auditing

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